Nataliya Gumenyuk: After a tough year, Ukrainians see hope and real change in the Kursk offensive

When Russia’s new assault on Ukraine’s northern Kharkiv region began in May, I traveled there to see what was going on. Billboards everywhere showed firefighters and community workers in action, with the slogan “Kharkiv Invincible.” Residents were angry about the bombs falling on their heads, but alongside fear there was grim optimism and determination.

I spoke with Oleksandr Solomashchenko, whose organization had helped 3,000 evacuees escape from the new frontline areas. Solomashchenko, usually cheerful and energetic, couldn’t stop crying. He remembered a family with a disabled child who was unwilling to accept his help and make the journey out of the area. I realized that being invincible doesn’t mean not feeling pain or being hurt. Solomashchenko’s emotions symbolize the many Ukrainians who are proud of how strong and resilient they are, but who at this stage of the war are not ashamed to cry and admit that we are also vulnerable and tired.

When I returned to Kharkiv this week, I found the city safer and in better spirits, with people escaping the summer heat in local parks. Despite the ongoing fighting nearby, fewer guided bombs are being sent to Kharkiv these days.

The Kursk offensive changed things. For the first time, the battle moved to Russian soil – and showed that it is not invincible. It boosted the morale of the Ukrainian population. A simple conversation with a few soldiers confirms this.

For Ukrainians, however, it is not the mood that counts, but the practical impact of this invasion: for example, the fact that destroying bridges in the Kursk region could slow down the flow of Russian raw materials to Ukraine.

The summer of 2024 was extremely tough, as Moscow managed to partially destroy Ukraine’s power grid. It is difficult to find a friend or colleague who would admit that after the summer vacation they feel well-rested and less tired.

As the now disappeared Ukrainian artist and soldier Yuri Stetskyk said, “War is not the end of life, but long and hard work.” Ukrainians see war as hard and necessary work, just as a firefighter or a surgeon would not stop a rescue operation or an operation just because they were tired. In addition to strategic military gains, the Kursk Offensive is seen as a major achievement that helps Ukrainians to keep breathing, use the moment to reallocate resources, and shift at least some of the burden of war onto the shoulders of Russian troops.

Olga Chyzh: Putin is under pressure and his options are shrinking

In one of the most audacious moves since the full-scale invasion of Russia, Ukrainian forces entered Russia’s Kursk region and seized a significant chunk of territory with striking ease. It took Moscow nearly two weeks to mobilize enough conscripts to slow Ukraine’s momentum. But the damage was done, and the message was unmistakable: The carefully orchestrated operation caught Vladimir Putin by surprise. Once again, Russia’s FSB security service, the linchpin of his power, was reeling.

That the FSB has failed to live up to Hollywood thriller expectations is not surprising. In authoritarian regimes, the rise of cadres is determined by loyalty, not talent. More tellingly—and boding well for Ukraine—Putin appears to have learned little from the war’s earlier miscalculations. His arrogance remains intact, and he continues to navigate this conflict as if blindfolded.

The Kursk operation exposed how much of Russia’s defense strategy hinges on the West’s fear of escalation. Every violation of Russia’s so-called “red lines”—whether tanks, planes, or missiles—reveals that Moscow’s threats are hollow. Even Putin seems to recognize that his nuclear saber-rattling has lost its power.

Domestically, Putin seems invulnerable. His political opponents are dead, exiled or jailed. But as Western-made tanks roll into Russia, Putin is living out his nightmare. Once revered as the master strategist who retook Crimea without firing a shot, he now risks having his legacy reduced to a blunder in a bloody quagmire. His FSB lieutenants may be behind him, their fate tied to his, but in terms of military strategy, he is running out of options.

Further mobilizations are yielding increasingly less. Rumors of a shift in command to trusted confidants and ongoing military purges are unlikely to improve Russia’s position on the battlefield. After all, fixers make bad generals. In classic Russian fashion, Putin’s last hope may be luck, but fortune favors the prepared. And Ukraine has learned that lesson.

Sergei Radchenko: Peace or victory seem far away, but the Kursk offensive can change things

When Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it was hard to imagine that the war would still be going on two and a half years later. Despite all the death and destruction we have seen, the front lines have barely moved in that time.

As the fighting continues and intensifies, the prospects for peace seem remote. The old adage that all wars end in a negotiated peace obscures a more complex reality. Wars can—and often do—end with one side on the losing side, and negotiations, even once they begin, can take years. What matters in these situations is the resilience of each side and the ability of each government to deal with domestic pressure for peace.

Vladimir Putin is confident that he can continue the war and is in no hurry to start negotiations. Part of this is just arrogance, which has not been broken even after Kursk. Part of this is calculation. Having invested so heavily in this war, Putin may feel that he has little to lose. He has already spent a lot of blood and treasure. He has exposed Russia to Western sanctions that are unlikely to go away. He is eager to collect the dividends that will justify these horrendous costs to the Russian people.

And while he is not very good at waging war, he has been brilliant at brainwashing people and rallying a large part of the Russian population behind his militant imperialism.

You often hear that Putin is waiting for the outcome of the US elections, or that he hopes that Donald Trump – if elected – will abandon Ukraine. What Putin actually benefits most from is the general policy paralysis of the kind we saw in the recent congressional debates on aid to Ukraine. What he benefits from is the uncertainty among Europeans, who are still looking over their shoulders to see what the US will or will not do with Ukraine.

Europe itself is hopelessly divided between those who have the ambition to take a stronger stance on Ukraine but perhaps lack the means to do so (e.g. the Baltic states and Poland), and those who have the means but clearly lack the ambition (e.g. Germany). Such divisions play into Putin’s hands and contribute to his determination to take whatever he can get from Ukraine.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy understands Putin’s game and hopes that by ordering the recent invasion of Kursk he will probably not only boost the faltering Ukrainian morale but also turn the tables and force the Russians to finally negotiate. He needs to show that he, like Putin, can continue this war for as long as necessary.

They can’t both be right.

Andrey Kurkov: Any decisive action seems impossible, but there is no despair

Yet another delay in the delivery of military aid from our allies has made me wonder if some of these delays are intentional. The war drags on. For the third time, Ukraine must celebrate its independence day under fire from missiles and drones, glued to reports from the front lines of the Russo-Ukrainian war.

There is a heavy sense of total slowdown. It seems impossible to imagine any dynamic action – anything that could suddenly end this war or radically change its course for the better.

Ukrainian troops advance in Kursk region, vow to leave when the time comes. Russian army advances in Donbas, but will not leave any territory it has conquered voluntarily, at least not until regime change in Moscow.

For a brief moment, the revival of the Kursk operation brought Ukrainian society to life, but now we are frozen in the tense observation of the Russian army’s advance in the east.

Nevertheless, morale remains firm. There is no depression or despair. Ukrainians who have chosen to remain in their country hope for a positive outcome to the war. They may be wary of the concept of “victory” and “complete liberation of occupied territories,” and yet patriotic self-censorship, if asked, will suppress any doubts about an ultimate victory for Ukraine.

Every Ukrainian resists the enemy with whatever he can – the army with weapons, citizens with a stubborn belief in victory. A belief that makes Independence Day an almost religious festival.

Before the war, Independence Day seemed to many – including myself – a much more formal occasion organized by the state for the media, more than for the people. Although every time there were big and politically challenging events, such as the Orange Revolution, the significance of the day became greater. Now it is definitely a day for all Ukrainians to think about and reflect on.